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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a sentence imposed for attempting to disarm 
a police officer, a second degree felony, and interfering with a peace officer, 
a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2013 Supp.). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Tyson Post did not go quietly when officers tried to arrest 
him for assaulting his girlfriend. Instead, he struggled, cursed, and, as he 
later stated: "I tried to take the cop[']s gun when he was trying to arrest 
me." Defendant pied guilty to attempting to disarm a police officer and 
interference with an arresting officer. On appeal, Defendant claiins he 
should have been placed on probation and treated for substance abuse 
instead sentenced to prison. This Court should affirm. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing Defendant 
to prison instead of in1posing probation and treatment for substance abuse? 
Standard of Review. "The sentencing judge 'has broad discretion in 
imposing [a] sentence within the statutory scope provided by the 
legislature."' State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, if3, 73 P.3d 991 (citation 
omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs if "the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive 
sentence." State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations 
and citation omitted). This Court will not overturn a trial court's sentencing 
decisions unless "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the h·ial court." Id.; accord State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, if12, 84 P.3d 
854. 
2. Did the trial court properly address and resolve alleged errors 
in the PSI before imposing sentence? 
Standard of Review. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a 
legal duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in 
sentencing reports is a question of law that we review for correctness." State 
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v. Waterfield, 2014 UT App 67, if29, 322 P.3d 1194 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
3. Did the trial court meet its statutory duty to order Defendant 
screened for possible substance abuse treatment? 
4. Did the trial court violate Defendant's constitutional right to 
equal protection by allegedly basing its sentencing decision on Defendant's 
Native American ancestry and his location on an "Indian reservation"? 
Standard of Review for Issues 3 and 4. These claims are both 
unpreserved and may not be reversed absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, i[13, 10 P.3d 346 (unpreserved 
claims reviewed for plain error, which required showing that (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful because without the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63M-7-305(1) (West 2013 Supp.) 
(authorizing preparation of PSI); 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1.1 (West 2013 Supp.) 
(authorizing screening and assessment of defendants for 
substance abuse); 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(6)(a) (West 2013 Supp.) 
( challenging accuracy of PSI). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 
Defendant Tyson Post resisted arrest and tried to disarm one of the 
officers who attempted to arrest him for assaulting his girlfriend. R41. The 
girlfriend called 911 after Defendant punched her in the eye when she asked 
him to leave. Id. When officers arrived, Defendant was belligerent and was 
eventually pinned against the wall by two officers. Even then, Defendant 
continued to resist, yelling obscenities and tryingto swing his fists. R41. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with seven crimes, including assault against a 
peace officer, assault in the presence of a child, and intoxication. Rl-2. He 
was also charged with disarming a police officer. R29, 41. 
As part of a plea agreement, Defendant admitted to attempting to 
disarm a police officer, a second degree felony, and interference with an 
arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor. R28. Defendant succinctly 
admitted his crimes in his written plea statement: "I tried to take the cop[1 ]s 




At the court's request - and with Defendant's consent-Adult 
Probation and Parole prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to 
aid the court in sentencing. R39-44. Defendant's criminal history was 
charted on the standard Criminal History Matrix, which assigns a nu1nerical 
value to a defendant's past crimes and suggests a range of possible 
sanctions for the current offense. R45. The PSI ranked Defendant's criminal 
history at four based on prior misdemeanors, one involving physical force 
or threat of physical force and one instance of court-supervised probation. 
R42, 45. Defendant's score placed him in the "intermediate sanctions" 
range, which made him eligible for probation, although the trial court still 
had discretion to impose prison. R45. 
The PSI also placed Defendant in the "high" risk and needs category 
because of the seriousness of his current offense-attempting to disarm a 
police officer - his lack of remorse, and his "lackadaisical" attitude. R41. 
The PSI also noted Defendant's unwillingness to address his substance 
abuse problems. Id. The report stated that Defendant had received a drug 
and alcohol abuse assessment, but refused to return to receive further 
treatment. Id. R39-42. The PSI investigator recommended that the court 
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deny probation and sentence Defendant to the statutory one to 15 years in 
prison. 1 R39. 
"[P]reth; severe con.duct" 
At sentencing, Defendant challenged the accuracy of the PSI. R712 
(Sentencing Hearing, dated December 2, 2013, Addendum B). Through his 
attorney, Defendant claimed he actually had only one prior misdemeanor 
conviction, not two to four, as stated in the PSI. R71:3. 3 Defendant also 
disputed the PSI's characterization of him as "very violent when he's under 
the influence of alcohol ... " Id. Defendant requested that he be placed on 
probation and sentenced to drug court to treat his substance abuse issues. 
R71:4. 
1The PSI also states that Defendant failed to complete the 
questionnaires and docmnents in his PSI packet and that he appears to 
show no remorse for his actions. R40. Additionally, Defendant is 
unemployed, has not been employed since 2011, and supports himself 
through "Tribal dividends." R44. 
2 The record index lists the sentencing transcript as page 71 of the 
record, but the transcript itself is not nu1nbered. The State will refer to the 
h·anscript as "R71:" followed by the transcript's numbered pages. 
3 Defendant also submitted a document captioned "Defense-Based 
Sentencirtg Report" prepared by Khn Harward, who is described as a 
"sentencing specialist." R47-65. The report purports to use many of the 
sa1ne criteria used by AP&P to prepare a PSI, although it calculates 
Defendant's criminal history at five, instead of four. R47. It recommends a 
sentence of supervised probation, jail time, and comn1unity service. Id. 
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The prosecutor disagreed. He told the court that Defendant's 
criminal history included numerous 1nisdemeanors. He referred 
specifically to DUis in 2004 and 2010, drug charges in 2011, and a previous 
charge of resisting arrest in 2012. R71:5. The prosecutor also noted that 
Defendant's current offense-resisting arrest and attempting to grab the 
officer's gun-was "pretty severe conduct" and warranted a prison term. 
R71:5. 
Because Defendant disputed the accuracy of the PSI, the court asked 
the Defendant which of his four prior misdemeanor charges resulted in 
convictions. Defendant could not remember. R71:8-9 
At the end of the hearing, the court determined that Defendant had at 
least two prior misdemeanor convictions, which left his criminal history 
score unchanged at four. R42, 71:9. Neither Defendant nor his attorney 
objected to this finding. See R71:9-10. 
The court sentenced Defendant to one to 15 years in the Utah State 
Prison for attempting to disarm a police officer and six months in jail for 
interfering with arrest. R71:10. The judge ran the sentences concurrently. 
Id. 
Defendant timely appealed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court was well within its discretion to impose prison 
instead of probation.. Defendants have no right to probation. The 
seriousness of Defendant's crime-atte1npting to disarm a police officer-
along with his criminal history and "lackadaisical" attitude warrai1ted a 
prison term. Certainly, it cannot be said that no reasonable jurist would 
take the view adopted by the sentencing court here. 
Point II: The trial court properly considered and resolved alleged 
errors in Defendant's PSI before hnposing sentence. At sentencing, the h·ial 
court carefully considered the alleged errors one by one and resolved the 
disputes without objection from Defendant. Accordingly, the sentence was 
not based on inaccurate h-tlormation. 
Point III: The trial court rn.et its statutory obligations to screen 
Defendant for possible substance abuse h·eahnent when the court ordered 
preparation of a PSI, which included an evaluation of Defendant for 
possible treahnent. 
Point IV: Nothing h1 the record suggests that the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to prison because of his Native A1nerican ancestry or 
his presence on ai1 Indian Reservation. Thus, Defendant's inadequately 
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briefed claim that the prison sentence violated his equal protection rights 
fails. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
In challenging his sentence, Defendant argues that the trial court 
should have given him probation and treatment for substance instead of 
prison. Defendant claims that his prison sentence resulted from the judge's 
failure to resolve factual disputes in the PSI, which in turn led the judge to 
refuse Defendant's request to be re-screened for possible substance abuse 
treatment in lieu of prison. Aplt.Br. at 11, 13. 
Defendant is wrong. First, on the record before it, the trial court was 
well within its discretion to sentence him to prison instead of probation. 
And the record frmn the sentencing hearing shows that the court carefully 
considered and properly resolved the alleged inaccuracies in Defendant's 
PSI before hnposing sentence. See R71:7-10. The record also shows that 
Defendant was evaluated for substance abuse treatment, but that he refused 
to undergo further h·ealment. R41. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and this Court should affirm Defendant's sentence. 
A. The trial court acted within its discretion 1n 
sentencing Defendant to prison instead probation. 
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Defendant had '"no right to be placed on probation .. .. "' State v. 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ,r36, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908, 
910 (Utah 1992)). The probation statute "gives the sentencing court full 
discretion not to suspend a sentence even if a defendant is eligible for 
probation under the statute. " State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ,r24, 53 P.3d 1082. 
When a defendant pleads guilty, "he is only entfrled to receive the sentence 
the law provides." Id.; see also State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, ,r3, 73 
P.3d 991 (trial court '"has broad discretion in hnposing [a] sentence within 
the statutory scope provided by the legislature"') (citation omitted). A h·ial 
court may impose probation only if "that will best serve the ends of justice 
and is c01npatible with the public interest." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 
1051 (Utah App. 1991). The" granting or withholding of probation involves 
considering intangibles of character, personality and attitude." Rhodes, 818 
P.2d at 1049 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
An abuse of discretion occurs only if "the actions of the judge 111 
sentencing were inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive 
sentence." State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (citation 
01nitted). A court abuses its discretion only when "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the h·ial court." Id.; accord State v. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ifl2, 84 P.3d 854. "Whether the trial court 
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properly complied with a legal duty is a question of law," reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 113, 6 P.3d 1133. 
Utah law also provides that any inaccuracies in the PSI that cannot be 
resolved by the parties shall be pointed out to the trial judge before 
sentencing. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(6)(a) (West Supp. 2013). If alleged 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved before sentencing, the court may grant an 
additional 10 working days to resolve them. Id. If the inaccuracies are not 
resolved during the 10-day period, "the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record." Id. 
Defendant has not de1nonstrated that the sentencing court acted 
outside its discretion in choosing prison over probation. A trial court 
properly exercises its sentencing discretion when the sentence is 
reasonable-that is, within the scope of the penalties provided by statute 
and supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, 13 
(h·ial court "has broad discretion in imposing (a] sentence within the 
statutory scope provided by the legislature"). Here, the prison tenn 
ilnposed by the h·ial court is within the scope defined by the legislature for 
the crimes Defendant cmnmitted. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.8(2) (West 
2013 Supp.) (attempt to disann a police officer, a second degree felony, 
punishable by one to 15 years); Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (West 2013 
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Supp.) (interference with an arresting officer, a class B Misdemeanor, 
punishable by up to six months in jail). 
In short, the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion because the 
prison terms were within "the statutory range" and not "clearly excessive." 
State v. Oliver, 2004 UT App 288 (Memorandum Decision); see also Montoya, 
929 P.2d at 358 (sentencing court acted within its discretion where sentence 
is not "inherently unfair" or "clearly excessive sentence"). There was no 
abuse of discretion because it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. 
B. The trial court correctly weighed the relevance and 
accuracy of Defendant's PSI before imposing sentence. 
According to Defendant, "key errors in the presentence report 
regarding [Defendant's] criminal history, history of violence, and supposed 
tendency to become violent and dangerous while intoxicated .. . should 
have been corrected before the court made its sentencing determination." 
Aplt.Br. at 13. Defendant claims that his prison sentence resulted from an 
inaccurate PSt which inflated his criminal history by unfairly adding an 
extra point" for having a prior violent conviction, when he had none." Id. 
At sentencing, Defendant argued that some of the cases included in 
the PSI did not result in convictions and should not have been used to 
calculate his criminal 1natrix score. R71:6. Defendant claimed that he had 
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only one prior misdemeanor conviction, while the PSI stated that he had 
"two to four" misdemeanors, which added an extra point and placed him in 
in the "intermediate sanctions" range on the matrix. Id.; see also R45. 
This claim is contrary to the record from the sentencing hearing. In 
fact, the sentencing judge carefully considered Defendant's criminal history 
and reviewed with him the cases listed in the PSI one by one. R71:6-9. The 
comt acknowledged that the outcome in some of the cases listed in the PSI 
was unclear. R71:8-9. The court asked Defendant how those cases were 
resolved; Defendant stated that he could not re1nember. Id. After hearing 
from Defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor, the court concluded 
that Defendant had at least two prior misdemeanor convictions from 
separate arrests in 2011 in Cedar City for possession or use of a controlled 
substance and another in 2012 in Mesquite, Nevada, resisting a public 
officer and other offenses. See R42, 71:9. Because the Mesquite charges 
involved force or threat of force, and because those charges of resisting 
arrest were similar to the charges at issue here, the PSI correctly in.eluded 
those in calculating Defendant's criminal history score, which placed him in 
the intermediate sanctions range on the mah·ix. See R45. 
Moreover, Defendant did not challenge these findings . R71 :9-10. If 
Defendant believed the trial court had not adequately addressed his 
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concerns, he could have requested a continuance. The probation statute 
allows a defendant to request a 10-day continuance to resolve alleged 
inaccuracies in the report. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(6)(a). Absent such a 
request from Defendant, the trial court was within its discretion to "make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record" and proceed with 
sentencing. Id. 
Defendant also argues that the PSI mistakenly characterized him as 
"becoming very violent and dangerous when intoxicated" and that this 
error resulted in an inaccurate criminal matrix score and a harsher sentence. 
Aplt.Br. at 13. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court specifically 
relied on the PSI's conclusion that Defendant becaine violent when 
drinking. But regardless, the PSI contained ample, undisputed information 
establishing Defendant's violent propensities when drinking. For exan1.ple, 
one arresting officer reported that Defendant struck the victim in the eye 
when she called 911 after Defendant refused to leave. R41. "While [she 
was] on the phone, [Defendant] punched her in the left eye . . . in the 
presence of their young daughter." Id. Defendant also "told her that when 
he gets out of jail he would murder her." Id. She also said that Defendant 
had tru:eatened her in the past and that she is "scared of him." Id. 
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Even Defendant's own PSI described Defendant's girlfriend as "[t]he 
victim of domestic violence," although it also stated that she "has 
remained" in the relationship. R49. It also stated that the victim 
accompanied Defendant to his interview and that she has no "apprehension 
or reservations" about Defendant, although she later confided to the 
interviewer that Defendant's "drinking has become 1nore problematic over 
the past year." R55 & n.11. 
Thus, the record shows that the court properly resolved relevant 
factual disputes before sentencing Defendant to prison and that the sentence 
was not based on inaccurate information. 
C. Defendant was "screened" for alcohol and drug abuse, 
as required by Utah law. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
ordering that he be u assessed" and "screened" for so-called fl drug court," 
which provides for probation and h·eatment in lieu of prison for eligible 
candidates. Aplt.Br. ·at 14-15. Before sentencing Defendant, the trial court 
"should have followed the statutory procedural directives set forth by the 
legislature to have [Defendant] first screened, and if screening so indicated, 
assessed for drug court." Id. at 16. 
This claim is unpreserved. Although Defendant requested screening 
for drug court at his sentencing hearing, he did not claim, as he does now 
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on appeal, that the court was statutorily required to order additional 
screening. Thus, to prevail on this claim, Defendant must show plain error, 
i.e., that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error_ is harmful because without the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, if 13, 10 P.3d 346. Defendant cannot show plain error. 
Utah law provides for "the screening, assessment, substance abuse 
h·eatment, and supervision" for defendants convicted of a felony. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63M-7-305(1) (West 2013 Supp.) and Utah Code Ann. § 71-
18.1.1(2) (West 2013 Supp.). "Screening" is "a preliminary appraisal" to 
detennine whether the offender should be "assessed" by a licensed mental 
health therapist to determine whether substance abuse treatment or other 
programs are needed. Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1.l(a) & (c). 4 The law states 
that, before sentencing, the trial court "shall" order convicted felons to be 
screened for substance abus~ issues and, if warranted, assessed for 
substance abuse treatment if the court finds that the defendant is an 
"appropriate candidate" for treatment. Utah Code Ann.§ 71-18.1.1(2)(a)-(c). 
4 The definitions of" screening" and "assessment" are incorporated by 
reference from Utah's DUI statutes. See Utah Code Ann. 41-6a-501(1)(a) & 
(f) (West 2013). 
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The findings from any screening or assessment are incorporated into the 
PSI. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1.1(3). 
Here, the trial court fully complied with the law. When Defendant 
pleaded guilty, the trial court ordered preparation of a PSI, which included 
screening Defendant for substance abuse issues and eligibility for treahnent. 
R37. After speaking with Defendant and the arresting officers., and 
reviewing the criminal history, the PSI investigators deemed Defendant 
"high risk" and recommended prison. R39-41. The PSI noted that 
Defendant has a history of alcohol-related offenses-including the present 
offense- and that he becomes "very violent" when intoxicated. R41. The 
PSI also stated that Defendant received an alcohol and drug abuse 
assessment but Defendant "refused to return to receive further treatinent." 
Id. The PSI concluded that Defendant's violent history, //lackadaisical" 
attitude, and lack of remorse made him a poor candidate for probation or 
supervision in a less restrictive setting. Id. 
During the sentencing hearing, Defendant renewed his request for 
probation and treatment and urged the court to reject the PSI' s prison 
recommendation. See R71. Defense counsel specifically asked that 
Defendant be "screened" for drug court. R71:2. Counsel claimed that the 
PSI' s determination that Defendant "had no desire to return for further 
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treatment ... is incorrect." R71:3. Rather, counsel argued, Defendant" does 
not want to take previously prescribed anti-anxiety medication because he 
didn't feel that it worked for him, but he does understand that he does need 
to address his alcoholism." Id. 
The trial court was not persuaded: "I'm not going to change anything 
in the report because I'1n perceiving all of these disputes as having to do 
with change of attitudes on [Defendant's] part from the time he spoke to the 
[AP&P] officer and today." R71:4. Neither defense counsel nor Defendant 
disputed this finding, even though both were given the opportunity to do 
so at the hearing. 
In short, by ordering a PSI, the trial court ensured that that Defendant 
would be screened for possible drug and alcohol treatment. And Defendant 
was, in fact, screened. R.41. But because Defendant was uncooperative, 
"lackadaisical," and unwilling "to return for further treatment," the PSI 
investigators saw no need to further evaluate Defendant for drug court. 
R41. Defendant has failed to show an obvious and prejudicial error where 
the trial court authorized the statutorily required screening for Defendant, 
adopted the PSI's conclusion that Defendant was not a good candidate for 
h·eahnent, and imposed a statutorily authorized prison term. 
-18-
D. The trial court did not discriminate against Defendant, 
based on his "family history" or his "location" on an 
Indian Reservation. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court unconstitutionally 
denied him probation and drug court because of his "family historyn and 
"location" on an Indian Reservation. Aplt.Br. at 10. Defendant bases this 
clailn on one comment from the trial judge: "I don't think that having him 
be in drug court down here [San Juan County] when he has as much of his 
family and history up in the Uintah Basin is ... going to be a practical 
solution to this situation." R71:10. 
But Defendant's insinuation that the judge's remark shows racial bias 
misconstrues what, in context, is merely an acknowledgement that drug 
h·eatment requires family support and is, therefore, impractical when 
Defendant lived many miles away. This claim is unpreserved and 
inadequately briefed. Without more, Defendant cannot show that the judge 
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection or otherwise erred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Respectfully submitted on September 15, 2014. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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§ 63M-7-305. Drug Offender Reform Act--Coordination, UT ST§ 63M-7-305 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 63M. Governor's Programs 
Chapter 7. Criminal Justice and Substance Abuse 
Pait 3. Utah Substance Abuse Advisory Council 
(I) As used in this section : 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63M-7-305 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-25a-205.5 
§ 63M-7-305. Drug Offender Reform Act--Coordination 
Currentness 
(a) "Counci l" means the Utah Substance Abuse Advisory Council. 
(b) "Drug Offender Refonn Act" and "act" mean the screening, assessment, substance abuse treatment, and supervision 
provided to convicted offenders under Subsection 77-1 8-1.1 (2) to: 
(i) determine offenders' spec ific substance abuse treatment needs as early as possible in the judicial process; 
(i i) expand treatment resources for offenders in the community; 
(iii) integrate treatment of offenders with supervis ion by the Department of Co1Tections; and 
(iv) reduce the incidence of substance abuse and related criminal conduct. 
(c) "Substance abuse authority" has the same meaning as in Section 17-43-201. 
(2) The council shall provide ongoing oversight of the implementation, functions, and evaluation of the Drug Offender Reform 
Act. 
(3) The counci l shall develop an implementation plan for the Drug Offender Refom1 Act. The plan sha ll : 
(a) identify local substance abuse authori ty areas where the act will be implemented, in cooperation with the Division of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health, the Department of Corrections, and the local substance abuse authorities; 
{b) include guide lines on how funds appropriated under the act should be used; 
V•/esll ,.-,Nexr @ 201,:!. Thomson Reuters. No claim t original U.S. Gove rnment Works. 
§ 63M-7-305. Drug Offender Reform Act--Coordination, UT ST§ 63M-7-305 
(c) require that treatment plans under the act are appropriate for criminal offenders; 
(d) include guidelines on the membership of local plann ing groups; 
(e) include guidelines on the membership of the Department of Corrections' planning group under Subsection (5); and 
(f) provide guidelines for the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to conduct an evaluation of the implementation, 
impact, and results of the act. 
(4)(a) Each local substance abuse authority designated under Subsection (3) to implement the act shall establish a local planning 
group and shall submit a plan to the council detailing how the authority proposes to use the act funds. The uses shall be in 
accordance with the guidelines established by the council under Subsection (3). 
(b) Upon approval of the plan by the council, the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health shall allocate the funds. 
{c) Local substance abuse authorities shall annually, on or before October I, submit to the Division of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health and to the council reports detailing use of the funds and the impact and results of the use of the funds during 
the prior fiscal year ending June 30. 
(S)(a) The Department of Corrections shall establish a planning group and sha ll submit a plan to the council detailing how 
the department proposes to use the act funds. The uses shall be in accordance with the gu idelines establ ished by the council 
under Subsection (3). 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall annually, before October I, submit to the council a report detailing use of the funds 
and the impact and results of the use of the funds during the prior fiscal year ending June 30. 
(6) The council sha ll monitor the progress and evaluation of the act and shall provide a written report on the implementation, 
impact, and results of the ac t to the Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the Health and Human Services legislative 
interim committees annually before November I. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § I 957 , eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 337 § 2, eff. July 1, 2009; Laws 20 l 0, c. 39, § 9, eff. May 11, 
2010; Laws 201 I, c. 51, § 6, cff. May 10, 2011. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63M-7-305, UT ST§ 63M-7-305 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
Eml or Doc11mcn1 i : ~nl-1 Thom~o11 J{~ulc1, . \J cl .,irn 10 original U.S. Gov~rnmcnt WMks. 
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§ 77-18-1.1. Screen ing, assessment, and treatment, UT ST§ 77-18-1.1 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 18. The Judgment 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1.1 
§ 77-18-1.1. Screening, assessment, and treab11ent 
Currentness 
(I) As used in this section: 
(a) "Assessment" has the same meaning as in Section 4 l-6a-50 I. 
(b) "Convicted" means: 
(i) a conviction by entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, guilty with a mental illness, or no contest; and 
(ii) conviction of any crime or offense. 
(c) "Screening" has the same meaning as in Section 4 J-6a-S0 I. 
(d) "Substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained through a substance abuse program that is licensed by the Office 
of Licensing within the Department of Human Services. 
(2) On or after July 1, 2009, the courts of the judicial districts where the Drug Offender Reform Act under Section 63M-7-305 
is implemented shall, in coordination with the local substance abuse authority regarding available resources, order offenders 
convicted of a felony to: 
(a) pa1iic ipa le in a screening prior to sentencing; 
(b) participate in an assessment prior to sentencing if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and 
(c) participate in substance abuse treatment if: 
(i) the assessment indicates trea tment to be appropriate; 
(ii) the court finds treatment to be appropriate for the offender; and 
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(iii) the court finds the offender to be an appropriate candidate for community-based supervision. 
(3) The find ings from any screening and any assessment conducted under this section shall be part of the presentence 
investi gation report submitted lo the court before sentencing of the offender. 
(4) Money appropriated by the Legislature to assist in the funding of the screening, assessment, substance abuse treatment, 
and supervision provided under th is section is not subject to any requirement regarding matching funds from a state or local 
governmental entity. 
Credits 
Laws 2005 I st Sp.Sess., c. 14, § 4, eff. Ju ly 1, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 61, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 2 I 8, § 4, eff. 
July 1, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 33 7, § 3, eff. July I, 2009· Laws 20 11 , c. 342, § L53, eff. May LO, 2011; Laws 2011, c. 366, § 
177. eff. May I 0, 20 I I. 
Notes of Decisions containing your search terms (0) 
View all I 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 .1, UT ST § 77-18-1.1 
Current through 2014 General Session. 
End of Ooc11111l'nl •·; ~01 -1 Thom~on Reuter~. Ko daim m original U.S. Govcn1111c-n1 Work$. 
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§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Pleas held in ... , UT ST§ 77-18-1 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 18. The Judgment 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Pleas held in abeyance--Probation--Supervision--
Presentence investigation--Standards--Confidentiali ty--Terms and conditions--
Termination, revocation, modification, or extension--Hearings--Electronic monitoring 
Currentness 
(I) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may 
hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, after 
imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or 
infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b )(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisd iction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the 
depa rtment. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
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§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Pleas held in ... , UT ST§ 77-18-1 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to detennine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and 
Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision and investigation 
standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon criteria in 
Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative 
appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of 
class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. 
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with depaiiment standards. 
(5)(a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the 
imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the 
department or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the 
victim and the victim's family ; 
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the 
payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution 
Act; 
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under Section 77-18-1 . 1; 
(iv) recommendations for treatment of the offender; and 
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§ 77-18-1. Su spens ion of sentence--P leas held in .. . , UT ST§ 77 -1 8-1 
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the offender has spent in the custody of the ja il and 
the number of days, if any, the offender was released to a supervised release or alternative incarceration program under 
Section 17-22-5.5 . 
(c) The co ntents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are not avai lable except by court order for purposes 
of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by lhe department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if 
not represented by counsel , the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, sha ll be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to 
resolve the alleged inaccurac ies of the report w ith the department. If after IO working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, 
the court shall make a determinati on of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fai ls to cha ll enge the accu racy of the presentence invest igation report at the time of sentencing, that matter 
shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any tes timony, evidence, or informat ion the defendant or the prosecuting 
attorney desires to present concern ing the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in 
open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probat ion, and as a condition of pro bation, the court may requ ire that the defendant: 
(a) perfo rm any or all of th e follow in g: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed al the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(ii i) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legall y liable; 
(iv) parti cipate in avai lable treatmen t programs, includ ing any trea tment program in which the defendant is currently 
participating, if the program is acceptable to the cou rt; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one yea r, in a cou nty jail designated by the department, after considering any 
recommendation by the courl as to which j ai l the cou11 finds mos! appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of e lectronic monitoring; 
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(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in 
Section 7 6-6-107. I ; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime 
Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other tenm and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, I 997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational 
certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational 
certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(8) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 76-3-20 1.1, with interest and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any extension of that period by the 
department in accordance with Subsection ( I 0) . 
( I 0)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 
months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class 8 or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or tem1ination of the probation period under Subsection (I O)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid 
balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable. 
If the court retains jurisdiction for this limited purpose, the court may order the defendant to pay to the court the costs 
associated with continued probation under this Subsection ( I 0). 
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(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance nol 
already recorded and immediately transfer responsibi lity to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(i ii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require 
the defendant lo show cause why the defendant's fai lure lo pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shal l notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in 
writing in advance in all cases when tennination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(i i) The notificat ion shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding accounts 
rece ivable. 
( 11 )(a)( i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and 
prior to a hearing lo revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation tenn unless the probationer 
is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement await ing a hearing or dec ision concerning revocat ion of probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the tota l probation tenn unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The nmning of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the 
terms and cond itions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
( l 2)(a)(i) Probati on may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a heari ng and 
a finding in court lhat the probationer has viola led the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been 
violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidav it al leging with particu larity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of 
probation, lhe court that authorized probation shall dete1111ine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to be lieve that 
revocation, modification, or ex tension of probation is justified. 
(i i) If the court determines there is probable cause, il shall cause to be served on the defendant a warrant for the defendant's 
arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, 
or extended. 
(c)( i) The order lo show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least 
five days prior to the hearing. 
(i i) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
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(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a ri ght to be represented by counsel al the hearing and to have 
counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent. 
(iv) The order sha ll also infonn the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii ) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses 
subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-vise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After th e hearing the cou rt shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, 
modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(I 3) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the custody of the Division of Substance Abuse 
and Mental HealtJ1 for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that : 
(a) th e defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatmen t space at the hospital is available fo r th e defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-l 5-6 I 0(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in 
this Subsection (I 3). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 2, Govemn,ent Records 
Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 630-2-403 and 630-2-404, the State Records Committee may not 
order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, 
the department may disclose the prcsentence investigation only when: 
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(a) ordered by th e court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) reques ted by a la w enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for purposes of supervision, 
confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by th e Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigat ion repo11 or the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) req uested by the vict im of the crim e discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized 
representative, provided that the disclosu re to the victim sha ll include only infonnation relating to statements or materials 
provided by the victim , lo the circumstances of the crime including statements by th e defendan t, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(l 5)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probat ion under the supervis ion of the department, except 
as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
{b) The departmen t shall establis h procedures and standards fo r home confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all 
individuals referred to the department in accordance with Subsection (l 6). 
( 16)(a) If the court places the defendan t on probation under this section, it may order the defendant to partic ipate in home 
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as described in this sec tion until fu rther order of the court. 
(b) The e lectron ic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's 
whereabouts . 
(c) The electronic mon itoring device shal l be used under conditions wh ich requi re: 
(i) the defendant lo wear an e lectronic monitoring dev ice at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant , so that th e defendan t's compliance wi th the court's order may 
be monitored. 
(d) lfa court orders a defendant to part icipate in home confinement through e lectronic monitoring as a condition of probation 
under thi s sect ion, il sha ll: 
(i) place the defendan t on probation under the superv ision of the Department of Corrections; 
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(ii) order the department to place an electron ic monitoring device on the defendant and install electronic monitoring 
equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(i ii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated wi th home confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electron ic monitoring only for those persons who have 
been determined to be indigent by th e court. 
(f) The department may provide the elect ronic monitoring desc ribed in this section ei ther directly or by contract with a private 
provider. 
Credits 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § I; Laws 1983, c. 47, § I; Laws 1983, c . 68, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws l 985, c. 212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § l ; Laws 1987, c . l 14, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, 
§ l; Laws l 990, c. 134, § 2; Laws J 99 1, c. 66, § 5; Laws l 99 l , c. 206, § 6; Laws l 992, c. 14, § 3; Laws l 993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 
1993, c. 220, § 3· Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws 1994, c. 198, § l ; Laws l 994, c. 230, § l; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 
I, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May I , 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § I, eff. May I, l 995; Laws 1995, c. 30 I , § 3, eff. May 
1, 1995· Laws 1995, c. 33 7, § 11 , eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May I , 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. 
April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § I 0, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. 
May 3, I 999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 200 l, c. 13 7, § I, eff. April 30, 200 I; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. 
May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, 5th Sp.Sess ., c. 8 § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003 · Laws 2005, 
1st Sp.Sess., c. 14, § 3, eff. Ju ly l, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 2 I 8, § 3, eff. July I , 2007; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 252, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2193, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 81, § 3, eff. May 12, 2009; La ws 20 I I , c. 366, § 176, eff. May I 0, 
20 11; Laws 2014, c. 120, § 3, eff. May 13, 2014; Laws 2014, c . 170, § I , eff. May 13, 20 14. 
Relevant Notes of Decisions (53) 
View nil 186 
Notes of Decisions listed below contain your search tcnns. 
Due process 
One of the requirements of due process in the context of a probation revoca tion hearing is the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. U.S.C.A. Cons!. Amend. 14; U.C.A. 1953, 77-I8-1(12)(d)(iii). Sta le v. Tate, 1999, 989 P.2d 73,380 
Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT App 302. Conslilui ional La w {F• 4733(2) 
Due process protections attach to statutory requirements whi ch afford probationers certain procedural protections before 
probation is extended. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A. 1953, 77-18-1 ( 12). Stale v. Marli n, 1999, 976 P.2d 1224, 364 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13, 1999 UT App 62. Cons ti tutiona l Law (=, 4731 
Under circumstances, due process did not require that probation violation report regarding probationer's progress at sex-offender 
therapy program have been sent lo probationer before revocation hearing or that proba tioner have been given additional lime lo 
review report at. hearing; probat ioner freely admitted having violated probation by taking ill egal drugs and failing to complete 
therapy program, revocat ion deci sion was based upon those unequivocal ad missions, and probationer was allowed to review 
repo rt and cou ld have addressed any gross inaccu racy at that time. U.S .C.A. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A. I 953, 77-18-I(6)(a) . 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 2, 2013) 
THE COURT : Tys on Post, 1317 - 64 . 
MS . MORGAN : Your Honor, Mr . Post is here for 
sentencing . There is a PSI from AP&P outside of this area 
-2 -
near Mr . Post ' s mother ' s house, and then there is a defense based 
PSI that I provided to Mr . Hal l s this morning and also -- or to 
Mr . Halls last week and to your Honor this morning . 
Before we p roce ed wi th sentencing , Mr . Pos t i s wondering 
if we would consider him bas ed on a l l the informat ion in both the 
reports as a candidat e f or drug court, and screen him for that . 
He has an extremely small criminal h istory , and I have that here 
with me , your Honor . Nothing on it I believe would bump him out 
of drug court . Addition -- but he does have an admitted alcohol 
problem . 
MR . HALLS : Where is Randl ett , Utah? 
MS . MORGAN : For t Duchesne area . That's where his 
mother lives , but his -- his gir l f ri end, who is also the mother 
of his -- one child or two? 
MR . POST : Yes . 
MS . MORGAN : Of his daughter lives in this area - - lives 
in Blanding . He could live here and participate that way if the 
drug court team would be willing to screen him . 
THE COURT : All right . Mr . Halls , are you supporting 



























MR . HALLS : I am , your Honor. 
THE COURT : Okay . Are there factual inaccuracies in the 
r eport , Ms . Morgan? 
MS . MORGAN : Judge , I believe you are - - there are . I 
have Mr . Post ' s Utah criminal history -- or his criminal history 
provided through discovery from Mr . Halls ' s office. I believe 
that Mr. Post only has one pri or conviction , if I may present 
that to your Honor . 
Also , Judge , i t says limited employment history and 
skills in his State PSI. He has had five different jobs since 
2004 when he graduated from high school . He also has an 
associate's degree , and the PSI doesn ' t indicate the secondary 
education . It indi cates in the PSI that there's no desire to 
return for further treatment , and that is incorrect . Mr. Post 
does not want to take previously prescribed anti - anxiety 
medication because he didn ' t feel that it worked for him , but he 
does understand that he does need to address his alcoholism . 
Also , Judge , it indicates in the pre-sentence report 
that he becomes very violent when he ' s under the influence of 
alcohol and becomes a serious threat to those in contact with 
him . There ' s nothing in his history that indicates that except 
the current charge , and I the victim - - the alleged victim in 
the case - - the victim in the case didn ' t indicate that there 
were any injuries , and in fact accompanied him to his appointment 














It also says that Mr . Post is not interested in getting 
work, and he would indicate that that ' s not correct. He has 
never had the opportunity to have any form of supervised 
probation, your Honor. 
THE COURT : Okay . I ' m not going to change anything in 
the report because I ' m perceivi ng all of these dispu tes as having 
to do with change of attitudes on his part from the time he spoke 
to the officer until today . Mr . Post, did you want to address 
the Court before I make a decis i on about sentencing? Did you 
want to say anything? 
MS. MORGAN: What would you like to say on your behalf? 
MR . POST : Yes . Well , your Honor, just you know , I'd 
13 like to let you know that - - well , as far as the charges are , you 
14 know , concerned, I do know -- feel remorse for what I've done , 
15 and you know , I just -- I ' d like you to know that I'm just here , 
16 basically , asking for your help . 
17 I don't see how , you know, prison would do me any good . 
18 I just think another step would be a lot more better to take 
19 going to drug court and everything else that -- you know , just 






out and everything. Yeah, that's about it, your Honor. 
THE COURT : Mr . Halls? 
MR . HALLS : Your Honor , there ' s a couple things in 
this -- in the evaluation that concern me. One of them is his 



























2010, drug charges in '11, and then he has a resisting public 
officer in 2012 , and then this charge is a similar, disarming a 
police officer . The officer indicate s that he told him he was 
going to take his gun, and he made an attempt to do that . That's 
pretty severe conduct on the part of somebody. If that isn't 
attributed to the alcohol , then I think we have a worse problem . 
So you know , Ms. Morgan indicates here that well , he -- there's 
no indication that he ' s violent . Well , there ' s a pretty good 
indication here that he does not want to follow any authority. 
The other t hing that kind of causes me concern about him 
is it took two of the officers to get him. He pushed against the 
officers when they arrested him, and he did the same thing when 
he was in the jail . Transport to San Juan County Jail , we talked 
about all that, but then the invest i gator 's comments, pre-
sentence report packet wa s incomplete. He basically says, "I 
put it off.u The officer -- the evaluator here says very 
lac kadais ical attitude, didn't appear to take legal matters 
seriously, showed no remorse. 
I do think he has a significant criminal history, and I 
do think that he has a significant his tory here with regard to 
just not wanting to fo llow authority. That concerns me about 
whether or not he'd be a good candidate for drug court. So with 
those concerns, your Honor, I am joining in the recommendation of 
Adult Probation and Parole. 



























THE COORT: Yes . 
MS . MORGAN : Your Honor , with regard to the charges that 
Ms . Halls read out to you, I believe he's reading from the pre-
sentence report, but I believe that the criminal history is 
different from that , and that the PSI writer .attributed some 
guilty dispositions to Mr . Post that were inaccurate. 
With regard to his attempt to disarm a peace officer , he 
pled to it, and he didn't do it as an Al ford plea, and he knows 
what he did because he read it in the report . I just do want to 
point out to the Court that he was face up against a wall , that 
he had two officers behind him. He was struggling and he was 
being difficult because he was drunk, but when he said, " I 'm 
going to take your weapon," he made a very small reach back, was 
immediately stopped by Mr . Whipple , never even was able to put 
his fingers or his hand on the weapon , and we're all glad for 
that. 
Also, Judge, just with looking at the sentencing factors 
and guidelines and the points, the criminal history record shows 
only one misdemeanor conviction, which would be one point, not 
two to four prior misdemeanors -- two points so he got extra 
points on form one for that . 
It also indicates that Tyson was on probation when the 
present offense was committed, which is four points, but it 
should only be four points when it ' s supervised, and -- as 



























convictions on his record, but he did get one point for that . 
he got more points than he should have when this document was 
being scored. 
THE COURT : Let ' s go over that. What you ' re saying is 
that he only had one previous misdemeanor conviction and so the 
score for that should have been one rather than two? 
MS. MORGAN : Correct. 
So 
THE COURT : Are you saying is that the only thing you 
have a quarrel with or --
MS . MORGAN: I think that he got four points for being 
on probation when t h e present offense wa s committed , and I think 
that that is inaccurate because he was not on supervised 
probation , he was simply on court probation. 
THE COURT : That ' s under supervision history , i s that 
what you 're --
MS . MORGAN : Uh-huh . 
THE COURT: I ' m not familiar with what the standard is 
for supervision, that it needs to be (inaudible) AP&P rather than 
court supervision . That's an interesting question . I ' ve never 
had to resolve that before that I can remember . When you 're 
scoring these do you view --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE : We score that any ki nd of probation 
(inaudible) judge, whether it ' s court or supervised probation . 
THE COURT : Court or AP&P or private probat ion or all 


























UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Right . 
MS . MORGAN : Okay . 
THE COURT: So what - - what was the deal with these 
charges in -- up in the Vernal/Duchesne area? You had two of 
- 8 -
them, 2004 and 2010 . They say adjudication -- one of them says 
adjudication pendin g . The other one says we don 't know what 
happened . Mr . Post , do you have any memory about those things ? 
MR . POST: Yeah , the -- it was transferred to the tribal 
courts , and the charges were dropped , I believe. 
THE COURT : You believe? 
MR . POST : Yeah , I spoke -- yeah , they were . I spoke 
with the judges and there had them transferred to tribal 
courts and the other charges were dropped. 
THE COURT : Did you have to do anything to get them 
dropped or they just dropped them? 
MR . POST: No , they j us t gave me -- I think community 
service . I think tha t wa s it. 
THE COURT : Why would they have been transfe rred? It 
looks l ike you were arrested by the tribal PD? 
MR. POST : Okay . Which one is he talking about , this 
one? 
MS . MORGAN: He 's asking about both . 
MR . POST : Okay . 
MS . MORGAN : Well , how about starting with this one with 

















MR. POST : In 2007 . 
MS . MORGAN : Judge , he's not remembering. 
MR . POST : Yeah. 
THE COURT : Okay . What happened with this case down in 
Mesquite, Nevada? 
MR. POST : It was when I went down to Mesquite. I was 
alone and --
MS. MORGAN: How did it turn out? Dismissed , guilty? 
MR . POST : I paid my bail amount and -- 450 for bail , 
and they told me to sign a paper , forfeit your bail and you don't 
have to return for court . 
THE COURT: Okay . Any l egal reason why sentence should 
not be pronounced? 
MS. MORGAN: No. 
THE COURT: Did you have any response you wanted to 










MR. HALLS : Well , your Honor, I guess that I ' m looking 
at the report ~hat was done , and assuming , I guess, that the 
investigator checked some of those out. The criminal history I 
have shows that some of those are pending clear back to 2004 , but 
I have nothing else, your Honor . 
THE COURT : Well, I find that there are at least two 
previous misdemeanor convictions . Most likely the -- well , the 
one in Cedar City and then the one in Mesquite , Nevada appear to 
































court. It's very difficult , I 'm sure, to get information, 
particularly the way relationships are between the state and 
county up there and the Uintah/Ouray tribe . I don ' t think that 
having him be in drug court down here when he has as much of 
his family and his history up in the Uintah Basin is - - as he 
does is is going to be a practical solution to this situation . 
It's the judgment and sentence of the Court that the 
defendant be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for a term of 
not less than one nor more than 15 years, and in the San Juan 
County Jai l for a period of six months . That will be served 
concurrent ly. I'm not going to grant the privilege of probation . 
He ' s remanded t o t he custody of the sheriff to be transported to 
the prison to serve that sentence . The amount of time you 
actually spend will be determined by the board of pardons . 
I ' m not going to impose a fine. I don ' t see any claim for 
restitution in this case. 
MS. MORGAN : There is none. 
THE COURT: Okay . That's it . 
(Hearing concluded) 
